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Digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of 
a digital message or document. The ordinary digital signature scheme allows single user 
to sign an online transaction. For the reason of integrity, nowadays many documents and 
online transactions need to be signed by more than one person in an organization. 
Threshold digital signature scheme are developed to overcome this problem. In a 
threshold signature scheme,  out of  members are required to sign an online 
transaction. In this research, we developed a new threshold signature scheme based on 
two number theory problems, namely factoring and discrete logarithms. The advantage 
of our scheme is based on the fact that it is very hard to solve both problems 
simultaneously. The security analysis of our scheme shows that our scheme is 
invulnerable against several securities threat, while performance evaluation shows that 


















Skema tandatangan digital ialah suatu skema matematik untuk menunjukkan kesahihan 
sesuatu mesej atau dokumen digital. Skema tandatangan digital biasa membenarkan 
seorang pengguna untuk menandatangani sesuatu transaksi atas talian. Walau 
bagaimanapun, diatas faktor integriti, kebanyakan dokumen dan transaksi atas talian 
pada masa kini memerlukan lebih daripada seorang penandatangan. Oleh sebab itu, 
skema tandatangan digital berkumpulan dibangunkan untuk mengatasi masalah ini. 
Dalam skema tandatangan digital berkumpulan,  daripada  pengguna diperlukan untuk 
menandatangani sesuatu transaksi atas talian. Dalam kajian ini, suatu skema tandatangan 
digital berkumpulan berasaskan masalah pemfaktoran dan logaritma diskret 
dibangunkan. Kekuatan skema baharu ini adalah berdasarkan fakta bahawa ianya adalah 
terlalu sukar untuk penggodam untuk menyelesaikan kedua-dua masalah pemfaktoran 
dan logaritma diskret secara serentak. Analisis keselamatan pula menunjukkan skema 
baharu ini kebal terhadap beberapa ancaman keselamatan, manakala penilaian efisiensi 
pula menunjukkan skema baharu ini memerlukan bilangan operasi yang munasabah 
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1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Cryptography is a science or study of methods for sending messages in secret (encipher 
or disguise messages) so that only the intended recipient can remove the disguise and 
read the messages (decipher it). The term cryptography itself comes from the Greek 
words; kryptos (hidden) and graphein (write). In cryptography, mathematicians and 
computer scientists play important role in designing cryptography systems. 
Mathematicians play the role to develop the algorithms/schemes of cryptography 
(cryptosystem, digital signature, authenticated encryption, etc.), while computer 
scientists develop the computer systems from the mathematical schemes. 
 
 Digital signature, which is one of the areas in cryptography, is a mathematical 
scheme for demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or document. The 
concept of digital signature was introduced by Diffie and Hellman (1976). However, in 
their outstanding paper “New Direction in Cryptography”, they just provide the idea of 
digital signature but not a scheme that could be implemented in practice. It was Rivest 
et. al. (1978) who introduced the first digital signature scheme based on the hardness of 
finding the prime factors of a large composite integer (factoring problem). Then, 
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ElGamal (1985) developed a new digital signature scheme based on discrete logarithms 
problem. 
 
 Currently, digital signatures are widely used for software distribution, internet-
based transactions, e-commerce, online file movement system, etc. In general, a digital 
signature scheme must satisfy the following properties: 
 
a) Authentic 
The signature convinces the document’s recipient that the signer truly signed the 
document. 
 
b) Not forgeable 
Nobody else except the signer can deliberately sign the document. 
 
c) Not reusable 




After the document is signed, it cannot be altered. 
 
e) Non-repudiated 
After signing the document, the signer cannot later claim that he or she did not 
sign it. 
 
Nowadays, many electronic documents need to be signed by more than one 
person. This problem brings the idea of society oriented cryptography, which is known 
as threshold cryptography (Desmedt, 1988; Desmedt & Frankel, 1989). The idea of the 
threshold cryptosystems introduced Desmedt used the concept of Shamir’s secret 
sharing (Shamir, 1979), which is based on Lagrange interpolation technique. However, 
the first threshold digital signature scheme was proposed by Desmedt and Frankel 
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(1991), where they applied the factoring problem in their scheme. Later, Harn (1994) 
proposed another threshold digital signature scheme from modified ElGamal scheme, 
which is based on discrete logarithm problem. In his paper, he stated the following 
properties of a  𝑡,𝑛  threshold signature: 
 
a) Any group signature is mutually generated by at least 𝑡 group members. 
b) The size of the group signature is equivalent to the size of an individual 
signature. 
c) The signature verification process is simplified because there is only one group 
public key required. 
d) The group signature can be verified by any outsider. 
e) The group holds the responsibility to the signed message. 
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
In the last three decades, many digital signature schemes have being developed based on 
various number theoretic problems such as factoring, discrete logarithm, and elliptic 
curve. Although the single-problem schemes remain unsolved today, but it is understood 
that one day such problems could be solved. When this happens, the signature based on 
those single problems no longer secured. That’s the reason why recent ordinary digital 
signatures were developed based on multiple hard number theoretic problems (Lee & 
Hwang, 1996; Laih & Kuo, 1997; He, 2001; Wang & Chang, 2003). However, in 
threshold digital signature, no scheme based on multiple problems has being applied. 
Due to this situation, we would like to apply the concept of multiple hard number 
theoretic problems in threshold digital signature. It is a strong assumption that the 
signature with multiple hard number theoretic problems will provide more security than 








The objectives of this study are: 
i. To develop a new threshold signature scheme based on two hard problems, 
namely factoring and discrete logarithm. 
ii. To analyze the security of the new scheme. 
iii. To evaluate the performance of the developed scheme. 
 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
With the new threshold signature scheme, it is expected that computer scientist can 
develop a more secure system in online services and transactions. Besides that, it will 
also support the environmentalists to reduce the usage of paper and encourage paperless 
documentation. Moreover, hopefully with this effort, mathematicians and cryptographer 
will do more research in developing more secure and efficient threshold signature 




1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
 
This report is organized and presented in five chapters. In Chapter 1, the research 
background, problem statements, objectives, and significance of the study are stated. In 
Chapter 2, some tools in cryptography are reviewed. Some groups in algebra that we 
need in our study are reviewed and then some topics in number theory also will be 
discussed. In Chapter 3, the new threshold signature scheme will be introduced. In this 
chapter, we will discuss all steps involve in the scheme and show an example of the 
scheme. The security analysis and performance evaluation will be discussed in Chapter 
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4. Finally, we will present the summary and conclusions of the findings and provide 





































In this chapter, we present mathematical definitions and results that will be needed for 
the scheme development. Then, we briefly discuss some cryptographic functions that 





In general, an algorithm is used as a tool for solving a well-specified computational 
problem. The problem statement specifies in general terms the desired input-output 
relationship. The algorithm describes a specific computational procedure for achieving 
the input-output relationship. It is usually of interest to find the most efficient algorithm 
for solving a given computational problem. The time that an algorithm takes to halt 
depends on the size of the problem instance. Also, the unit of time used should be made 
precise, especially when comparing the performance of two algorithms. The formal 




Definition 2.1  An algorithm is any well-defined computational procedure that takes a 
variable input and halts with an outputs. An algorithm is thus a sequence of 
computational steps that transform the input into output. 
 
 
2.2 GROUP THEORY 
 
Group theory plays an important role in digital signatures. In this section, we will review 





Let 𝑆 be a nonempty set and ∗ be a binary operation that maps elements in 𝑆 × 𝑆 to 𝑆; 
mathematically we write as ∗∶   𝑎, 𝑏 ↦ 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏. 
 
Definition 2.2  A binary operation ∗ is called commutative and associative if 
𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑎 and  𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 ∗ 𝑐 = 𝑎 ∗  𝑏 ∗ 𝑐  







Definition 2.3  A group, denoted as  𝐺,∗ , is a set 𝐺 together with a binary operation ∗ 
on elements of 𝐺 such that the following are satisfied: 
i. The operation ∗ is associative. 
ii. 𝐺 contains an element 𝑒, called as identity element such that 
𝑒 ∗ 𝑎 = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒 = 𝑎 
holds for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺. 
iii. For every 𝑎 in 𝐺, there exists an element 𝑏 such that 
𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝑎 = 𝑒. 
The element 𝑏 is called as inverse of 𝑎 under the binary operation ∗. 
If the operation ∗ is commutative, then the group is called abelian group. The group is 
called finite if  𝐺  (cardinality of 𝐺) is finite and the number of elements of a finite 
group is called as its order. In a group, the identity element is unique as is the inverse of 
any element. 
 
Definition 2.4  A group 𝐺 is called cyclic group if there exists an element 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺 such 
that for every element 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺 can be written in the form of 𝑏 = 𝑎𝑥  for some 𝑥 ∈ ℤ. Such 
an element 𝑎 is called a generator of 𝐺 and can be written as  𝑎 = 𝐺 to indicate that 𝑎 
generates 𝐺. 
 
Definition 2.5  The order of an element 𝑏 ∈ 𝐺 , denoted by ord 𝑏 , is the smallest 
positive integer 𝑛 such that 𝑏𝑛 = 1. 
 
The order of any element of a finite group divides the order of the group. If 𝑎 is a 
generator of a cyclic group of order 𝑚, then the element 𝑏 = 𝑎𝑖  has order 𝑚|gcd 𝑚, 𝑖 . 
In particular, 𝑏 is a generator of 𝐺 if and only if gcd 𝑚, 𝑖 = 1. Hence, if 𝑚 is a prime, 
then every element different from 1 is a generator of 𝐺. 
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In our scheme, we consider the following two important groups: 
i. The set of integers modulo 𝑛  together with addition modulo 𝑛  constitutes an 
abelian group of order 𝑛. This group is denoted by ℤ𝑛 =  0,1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1 . 
ii. The set formed by the positive integers smaller than 𝑛 and relatively prime to 𝑛 
together with the multiplication modulo 𝑛 . This group is called as the 
multiplicative group and denoted by ℤ𝑛
∗ =  𝑘|1 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝑚, gcd 𝑘,𝑚 = 1 . 
 
 
2.3 NUMBER THEORY 
 
Number theory plays important role in cryptography. In modern cryptography, messages 
are represented in numerical value and the steps or processes in cryptography, either in 
cryptosystem or digital signature, are being done by mathematical operation. In this 






Definition 2.6  An integer 𝑏 is said to be divisible by an integer 𝑎 ≠ 0, denoted by 𝑎|𝑏, 
if there exists some integer 𝑐 such that 𝑏 = 𝑎𝑐. We write 𝑎 ∤ 𝑏 to indicate that 𝑏 is not 






Definition 2.7  Let 𝑎 and 𝑏 be given integers, with at least one of them different from 
zero. The greatest common divisor of 𝑎 and 𝑏, denoted by gcd 𝑎, 𝑏 , is the positive 
integer 𝑑 satisfying the following conditions: 
i. 𝑑|𝑎 and 𝑑|𝑏. 





One of the most basic in number theory is congruences, or also known as modular 
arithmetic. Here, we review some important definitions and theorems that are related 
with our threshold signature scheme. 
 
Definition 2.8  Let 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑛 be integers, with 𝑛 ≠ 0. We say that 𝑎 is congruent to 𝑏 
modulo 𝑛, denoted by 𝑎 ≡ 𝑏  mod 𝑛 , if 𝑎 − 𝑏 is a multiple of 𝑛. 
Another formulation is that 𝑎 ≡ 𝑏  mod 𝑛  if 𝑎 and 𝑏 differ by a multiple of 𝑛. This can 
be written as 𝑎 = 𝑏 + 𝑛𝑘 for some integer 𝑘 (positive or negative). 
 
Theorem 2.1  Let 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, and 𝑛 be integers with 𝑛 ≠ 0. 
i. 𝑎 ≡ 0  mod 𝑛  if and only if 𝑛|𝑎. 
ii. 𝑎 ≡ 𝑎  mod 𝑛 . 
iii. 𝑎 ≡ 𝑏  mod 𝑛  if and only if 𝑏 ≡ 𝑎  mod 𝑛 . 





i. 𝑎 ≡ 0  mod 𝑛  means that 𝑎 = 𝑎 − 0 is a multiple of 𝑛, which is the same as 
𝑛|𝑎. 
ii. 𝑎 − 𝑎 = 0 ⋅ 𝑛, so 𝑎 ≡ 𝑎  mod 𝑛 . 
iii. If 𝑎 ≡ 𝑏  mod 𝑛 , we can write it as 𝑎 − 𝑏 = 𝑛𝑘 . Then, 𝑏 − 𝑎 = 𝑛(−𝑘) , so 
𝑏 ≡ 𝑎  mod 𝑛 . Reversing the roles of 𝑎 and 𝑏 gives the reverse implication. 
iv. Write 𝑎 = 𝑏 + 𝑛𝑘  and 𝑐 = 𝑏 + 𝑛𝑙 . Then, 𝑎 − 𝑐 = 𝑛𝑘 − 𝑛𝑙 = 𝑛(𝑘 − 𝑙) . So, 
𝑎 ≡ 𝑐 mod 𝑛 . 
         
 
Definition 2.9  Suppose that 𝑎 ∈ ℤ𝑛 . The multiplicative inverse of 𝑎  is an element 
𝑏 ∈ ℤ𝑛  such that 𝑎𝑏 ≡ 1  mod 𝑛 , or 𝑏 ≡ 𝑎
−1  mod 𝑛 . 
 
 
2.3.3 Prime Numbers 
 
In number theory, the concept of prime numbers is widely used in mathematical 
computation of cryptography. Many hard problems in cryptography, such as factoring 
and discrete logarithm, use prime numbers in the difficulty of certain computation. In 
this section, we recall the definitions and theorems relate to the prime numbers. 
 
Definition 2.10  A number 𝑝 > 1 that is divisible only by 1 and itself is called a prime 




Theorem 2.2  Every positive integer 𝑛  can be expressed as a product of primes, 
symbolically written as 𝑛 = 𝑝1
𝑎1𝑝2
𝑎2 …𝑝𝑙
𝑎𝑙 , where 𝑝𝑖  for 𝑖 =  1, 2,… , 𝑙 are distinct 
primes. This factorization is unique, up to reordering the factors. 
 
Proof: 
There is a small technicality that must be dealt with before we begin. When dealing with 
products, it is convenient to make the convention that an empty product equals 1. This is 
similar to the convention that 𝑥0 = 1. Therefore, the positive integer 1 is a product of 
primes, namely the empty product. Also, each prime is regarded as a one factor product 
of primes. 
Suppose there exist positive integers that are not product of primes. Let 𝑛 be the 
smallest such integer. Then, 𝑛 cannot be 1 (the empty product), or a prime (a one factor 
product), so 𝑛 must be composite. Therefore, 𝑛 = 𝑎𝑏 with 1 < 𝑎, 𝑏 < 𝑛. Since 𝑛 is the 
smallest positive integer that is not a product of primes, both 𝑎 and 𝑏 are products of 
primes. But a product of primes times a product of primes is a product of primes, so 
𝑛 = 𝑎𝑏 is a product of primes. This contradiction shows that the set of integers that are 
not products of primes must be the empty set. Therefore, every positive integer is a 
product of primes. 
                    
 
Definition 2.11  Suppose that 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ . We say that 𝑎  and 𝑏  are relatively prime if 
gcd 𝑎, 𝑏 = 1. (Note that 𝑎 and 𝑏 not necessarily primes). 
 
Theorem 2.3  Let 𝑔 be a primitive root for the prime 𝑝. 
i. If 𝑛 is an integer, then 𝑔𝑛 ≡ 1  mod 𝑝  if and only if 𝑛 ≡ 0  mod 𝑝 − 1 . 




i. If 𝑛 ≡ 0 (mod 𝑝 − 1), then 𝑛 =  𝑝 − 1 𝑚 for some 𝑚. Therefore,  
𝑔𝑛 ≡  𝑔𝑚 𝑝−1  ≡ 1  mod 𝑝  
by Fermat’s theorem. 
 
ii. Suppose that 𝑔𝑗 ≡ 𝑔𝑘 mod 𝑝 . Dividing both side by 𝑔𝑘  yields 𝑔𝑗−𝑘 ≡
1 mod 𝑝 . By (i), 𝑗 − 𝑘 ≡ 0 mod 𝑝 − 1  so 𝑗 ≡ 𝑘 mod 𝑝 − 1 . 
         
 
Definition 2.12  Let 𝑛 be a positive integer. The Euler-phi function, 𝜙 𝑛  is defined as 
follows: 
𝜙 𝑛 =   𝑘|1 ≤ 𝑘 < 𝑛, gcd 𝑘,𝑛 = 1   
 
Equivalently, for an integer 𝑛 =  𝑝𝑖
𝑎𝑖𝑙
𝑖=1 ,, where 𝑝𝑖’s are distinct primes, we have that  
𝜙 𝑛 = 𝑛  1 −
1
𝑝𝑖
 𝑙𝑖=1 . 
 
Two of the most basic theorems in number theory are Fermat’s little theorem and 
Euler’s theorem. These two theorems recently proved to have important cryptographic 
applications and will be used in our scheme. 
 
Theorem 2.4  (Fermat’s Little Theorem) If 𝑝 is a prime and 𝑝 does not divide 𝑎, then 







We begin by considering the first 𝑝 − 1 positive multiples of 𝑎; that is the integers 
𝑎, 2𝑎, 3𝑎,…  ,  𝑝 − 1 𝑎 . None of these numbers is congruent modulo 𝑝 to any other, nor 
is any congruent to zero. Indeed, if it happened that  
𝑟𝑎 ≡ 𝑠𝑎  mod 𝑝 , for 1 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑝 − 1 
then 𝑎 could be cancelled to give 𝑟 ≡ 𝑠  mod 𝑝 , which is impossible. Therefore, the 
previous set of integers must be congruent modulo 𝑝 to 1, 2, 3,…  ,𝑝 − 1, taken in some 
order. Multiplying all these congruences together, we find that 
𝑎 ⋅ 2𝑎 ⋅ 3𝑎 ⋅⋅⋅  𝑝 − 1 𝑎 ≡ 1 ⋅ 2 ⋅ 3 ⋅⋅⋅  𝑝 − 1 (mod 𝑝) 
whence 
𝑎𝑝−1 𝑝 − 1 ! ≡  𝑝 − 1 ! (mod 𝑝) 
Once  𝑝 − 1 ! is cancelled from both side of the preceding congruence (this is possible 
because 𝑝 ∤  𝑝 − 1 ! ), our line of reasoning culminates in the statement that  
𝑎𝑝−1 ≡ 1  mod 𝑝 , which is Fermat’s little theorem. 
                    
 
Theorem 2.5  (Euler’s Theorem) If 𝑎 and 𝑛 are positive integers, where gcd 𝑎,𝑛 = 1, 
then 
𝑎𝜙 𝑛 ≡ 1  mod 𝑛  
 
Proof: 
Take 𝑛 > 1. Let 𝑎1,𝑎2,… ,𝑎𝜙 𝑛  be the positive integers less than 𝑛 that are relatively 
prime to 𝑛. Because gcd 𝑎,𝑛 = 1, it follows that 𝑎𝑎1,𝑎𝑎2,… ,𝑎𝑎𝜙 𝑛  are congruent, 




′   mod 𝑛  
𝑎𝑎2 ≡ 𝑎2
′  (mod 𝑛) 
⋮ 
𝑎𝑎𝜙(𝑛) ≡ 𝑎𝜙(𝑛)




′  are the integers 𝑎1,𝑎2,… ,𝑎𝜙 𝑛  in some order. On taking the 
product of these 𝜙 𝑛  congruences, we get 
 𝑎𝑎1  𝑎𝑎2 …   𝑎𝑎𝜙 𝑛  ≡ 𝑎1
′ 𝑎2
′ …𝑎𝜙(𝑛)
′   mod 𝑛  
                                              ≡ 𝑎1𝑎2 …  𝑎𝜙 𝑛   mod 𝑛  
and so 
𝑎𝜙 𝑛  𝑎1𝑎2 …  𝑎𝜙 𝑛  ≡ 𝑎1𝑎2 …  𝑎𝜙 𝑛   mod 𝑛  
Because gcd 𝑎𝑖 ,𝑛 = 1 for each 𝑖, it implies that gcd 𝑎1𝑎2 …  𝑎𝜙 𝑛 ,𝑛 = 1. Therefore, 
we may divide both sides of the foregoing congruence by the common factor 
𝑎1𝑎2 …  𝑎𝜙 𝑛 , leaving us with  
𝑎𝜙 𝑛 ≡ 1  mod 𝑛  
         
 
 
2.4 HARD PROBLEMS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 
In cryptography, there are many hard number theoretic problems have been used to 
design a scheme. Some examples of the problems that commonly use in cryptography 
are factoring, residuosity, discrete logarithm, and elliptic curve. In this section, we 
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discussed two of the problems, factoring and discrete logarithm, that being used in our 
threshold signature scheme. 
 
 
2.4.1 Factoring Problem 
 
Factoring problem is one of the most popular problems in cryptography. Since Rivest et. 
al. (1978) introduced factoring problem in cryptography, many digital signature schemes 
and cryptosystems were developed based on this problem. Actually, there are many 
algorithms that can solve this problem but they need unreasonable amount of time and 
memory. 
 
Definition 2.13  The integer factorization problem (FAC): Given a positive integer 𝑛, 
find its prime power factorization, i.e., find pair-wise distinct primes 𝑝𝑖  and positive 
integers 𝑒𝑖  such that 𝑛 = 𝑝1
𝑒1 ⋅ 𝑝2




2.4.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem 
 
Another popular problem in cryptography is discrete logarithms. It is ElGamal (1985), 
who introduced this problem in cryptography. In his paper, he used discrete logarithm 





Definition 2.14  Let 𝐺  be a finite cyclic group and 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺  be a generator of 𝐺 . The 
discrete logarithm problem of some element 𝑎 ∈ 𝐺, denoted 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑎, is the unique integer 
𝑥, 0 ≤ 𝑥 <  𝐺 , such that 𝑎 = 𝑔𝑥 . 
 
If 𝑔 is not a generator, the notion of the discrete logarithm of 𝑎 to the base 𝑔 is extended 
to be the smallest integer 𝑥, such that 𝑎 = 𝑔𝑥 , if it exists. Here, the discrete logarithm is 
called the index of the element 𝑎. 
 
Definition 2.15  The discrete logarithm problem (DLP): Given a finite cyclic group 𝐺, a 
generator 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 , and an element 𝑎 , find the integer 𝑥 , 0 ≤ 𝑥 <  𝐺 − 1 , such that 
𝑎 = 𝑔𝑥  holds. 
 
 
2.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS 
 
Functions in cryptography are important in constructing a cryptographic system. The 
functions will make sure a cryptographic system or digital signature scheme remain hard 
to break. Here, we discuss some types of functions that widely used in developing 
cryptographic system. 
 
Definition 2.16  A function is defined by two set 𝑋 and 𝑌 and a rule 𝑓, which assigns to 
each element in 𝑋 precisely one element in 𝑌. The set 𝑋 is called domain of the function 
while 𝑌 is the range of the function. If 𝑥 is an element of 𝑋, the image of 𝑥 (denoted by 
𝑦 = 𝑓 𝑥 ) is the element in 𝑌, which the rule 𝑓 associates with 𝑥. If 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌, then the pre-
image of 𝑦 is an element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 for which 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑦. 
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2.5.1 One-Way Function 
 
Definition 2.17  A function 𝑓:𝑋 → 𝑌 is called a one-way function if 𝑓 𝑥  is easy to 
compute for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, but it is difficult to obtain 𝑥 from 𝑓 𝑥 . 
 
A clear example of this function can be seen in discrete logarithm problem. Let 𝑋 = 𝑌 =
𝑍𝑝
∗ , and define 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑔𝑥   mod 𝑝 , where 𝑔 is a generator of the multiplicative group. 
Obviously, given 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, it is easy to compute 𝑓(𝑥) but given 𝑔𝑥 , it is hard to obtain 𝑥. 
 
2.5.2 Trapdoor One-Way Function 
 
Definition 2.18  A one-way trapdoor function is a one-way function 𝑓:𝑋 → 𝑌 with the 
additional property that given some extra information, called trapdoor information, that 
is it become easy to find any given 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌, an 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 such that 𝑓 𝑥 = 𝑦. 
 
An example for this trapdoor one-way function can be shown in factoring problem. 
Consider a function defined by 𝑓 𝑚 = 𝑚𝑒   mod 𝑝𝑞 , where 𝑝  and 𝑞  are two large 
primes and 𝑒 is an integer satisfying gcd 𝑒,  𝑝 − 1  𝑞 − 1  = 1. Given 𝑚, it is easy to 
compute 𝑓(𝑚). However, given 𝑓(𝑚), it is hard to derive 𝑚 unless we know a trapdoor 







2.5.3 Hash Function 
 
Cryptographic hash functions play an important role in signature scheme. They are used 
to reduce long messages of arbitrary length to a fixed length of bit-strings so that the 
running of signing algorithm can be made even faster. 
 
Definition 2.19  A has function is a function 𝐻:  0,1 ∗ →  0,1 𝑙  mapping binary strings 
of arbitrary finite length to binary strings of a fixed length 𝑙. 
 
For current security, an output of size 160-bits of hash function is reasonable. In 
cryptographic requirement, the hash function must efficiently computable and satisfies 
one of the following properties: 
1) Weak collision-resistant: For a given 𝑎 , it is hard to find 𝑏 ≠ 𝑎  such that 
𝐻 𝑎 = 𝐻 𝑏 . 
2) Strong collision-resistant: It is hard to find a pair (𝑎, 𝑏) with 𝑏 ≠ 𝑎  such that 






















In previous chapter, we already discussed about tools that regularly used in constructing 
cryptographic systems and digital signature schemes. In this chapter, we will introduce a 
new threshold signature scheme based on two hard number theoretical problems, namely 
factoring and discrete logarithm. 
 The security of this threshold signature scheme is based on the difficulty of 
solving both problems, factoring and discrete logarithm, simultaneously. This scheme is 
modified from the ordinary signature scheme proposed by Ismail et. al. (2009). In this 
scheme, a trusted dealer (TD) is required to generate the parameters and keys for the 
users and group. TD also plays the role verify the partial signatures and construct the 
group signature. 
 Basically, a digital signature scheme consists of three steps; generating keys, 
signing message, and verifying signature. In the key generation step, TD will generate 
the public and secret keys. In ordinary signature scheme, the secret keys will be kept by 
an individual; while in threshold signature scheme, the secret keys will be shared among 
𝑛 users. In this scheme, we use Shamir’s secret sharing technique to distribute the secret 
keys among the users. We will discuss about the technique in the next subtopic. 
21 
 
For the message signature, 𝑡 out of 𝑛 users will collaborate to sign a message by 
using their pieces of secret keys and produce a partial signature. They send the partial 
signatures to TD and TD will verify the validity of the partial signatures. After TD 
verifies that all partial signatures are valid, then TD generates the group signature from 
the partial signatures. Then, TD produces the group signature along with the hash-




3.1 SHAMIR’S SECRET SHARING 
 
This technique was invested by (Shamir, 1979) by using the Lagrange interpolation 
technique. The idea of this technique is two point is needed to form a polynomial 
function of degree one, three point is needed to form a polynomial function of degree 
two, and so on. Generally, we can write this statement as follows: 
 
Proposition 3.1  𝑡 points is needed to form a polynomial function of degree 𝑡 − 1. 
 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme can be defined as follows: 
 
Definition 3.1  Let 𝑡, 𝑛 be positive integers with 𝑡 ≤ 𝑛. A  𝑡, 𝑛  threshold scheme is a 
method of sharing a message 𝑚  among a set of 𝑛  participants such that any subset 
consisting of 𝑡 participants can reconstruct the message 𝑚, but no subset of smaller size 




 The secret message 𝑚 is represented as a number mod 𝑝, and we want to split it 
among 𝑛 participants so 𝑡 out of 𝑛 are needed to reconstruct the message. The first thing 
we do is construct a polynomial function of degree 𝑡 − 1 as follows: 
𝑃 𝑥 = 𝑚 + 𝑠1𝑥 + 𝑠2𝑥
2 + ⋯+ 𝑠𝑡−1𝑥
𝑡−1  mod 𝑝  
where 𝑠1, 𝑠2,…  , 𝑠𝑡−1 are any positive integers mod 𝑝. The prime 𝑝 is made public but 
the polynomial function 𝑃(𝑥) is kept secret (notice that, if 𝑃(𝑥)is known to anybody, 
then 𝑚 is not a secret anymore). Then, set a pair  𝑥𝑖 ,𝑃 𝑥𝑖   for each participants. 𝑥𝑖’s 
represent the public individual identity, which is known to all, while 𝑃(𝑥𝑖) ’s are 
individual secret. 
 To reconstruct the secret message, (𝑡,𝑛)  participants must collaborate to 
calculate the value of the secret 𝑚 by using the formula: 









   mod 𝑝 . 
 In our threshold signature scheme, we apply the Shamir’s secret sharing 
technique to split the secret keys among the participants. Then, each user calculates 






 by using the public individual identities and their 𝑃(𝑥𝑖) and sends 
it to the TD as partial signature. Lastly, TD calculates  𝑣𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1  to reconstruct the secret 
key, that will be used in the group signature generation. By this way, the secret key will 








3.2 THE NEW THRESHOLD SIGNATURE SCHEME 
 
We proposed a new threshold signature scheme based on factoring and discrete 
logarithm. The following parameters and notations will be used throughout this scheme 
unless otherwise specified: 
 𝑕 𝑚  is the one-way hash function of the message 𝑚. 
 𝑝 is a 1024-bits prime number. 
 𝑛 = 𝑎𝑏 is a factor of 𝑝 − 1, that is the product of two primes 𝑎 and 𝑏. 
 𝜙 𝑛  is the Euler’s phi function of 𝑛, i. e. 𝜙 𝑛 =  𝑎 − 1  𝑏 − 1 . 
 𝑔 is a primitive root mod 𝑝, satisfying 𝑔𝑛 ≡ 1  mod 𝑝 . 
 
All of the parameters above are made public, except the values of 𝑎  and 𝑏 . 
Notice that, the reason for keeping 𝑎 and 𝑏 secret is to make sure that computing 𝑒-th 
root modular 𝑛 cannot be solve by any outsider and the participants due to the factoring 
problem. Refer to subtopic 2.5.2 for detail explanation. 
As we stated earlier, a digital signature scheme consists of three steps; generating 
keys, signing message, and verifying signature. In the following subtopics, we will show 
our new scheme and give a numerical example to show how it works. 
 
3.2.1 Generating Keys 
 
Let 𝑢𝑖  denote the group members and there are 𝑛  group members so 𝑡  from them 
 𝑢1,𝑢2,… , 𝑢𝑡  can represent to sign the message. 
1) The trusted dealer picks randomly 𝑒 ∈ ℤ𝑛
∗  such that gcd 𝑒,𝑛 = 1  and then 
calculates 𝑑 such that 𝑒𝑑 ≡ 1  mod 𝜙 𝑛  . 
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2) Then, he constructs a secret  𝑡,𝑛  polynomial threshold function, 𝑃 𝑥 = 𝑎0 +
𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎2𝑥
2 + ⋯+ 𝑎𝑡−1𝑥
𝑡−1  mod 𝑛 , where 𝑎𝑖  are random integers between 1 
and 𝑛 − 1, and 𝑖 = 0,1,2,… , 𝑡 − 1. 
3) From the threshold function 𝑃 𝑥 , he sets the group secret key, 𝑃 0 = 𝑎0, and 
calculates the corresponding public key, 𝑉 ≡ 𝑔𝑎0   mod 𝑝 . 
4) He also sets a pair of key  𝑥𝑖 ,𝑃 𝑥𝑖   for each group member 𝑢𝑖 , where 𝑥𝑖  is the 
public identity and 𝑃 𝑥𝑖  is the secret key for each member. 
5) After each member receives their pair of key  𝑥𝑖 ,𝑃 𝑥𝑖  , each of them computes 
the corresponding individual public key 𝑦𝑖 ≡ 𝑔
𝑃 𝑥𝑖   mod 𝑝 .  
 
The public and secret keys of the individual and group for the scheme are shown in 
Table 3.1. 
 
TABLE 3.1. The public and secret keys of the scheme. 
 Public key Secret key 
Individual 𝑦𝑖  𝑃 𝑥𝑖  
Group 𝑒,𝑉 𝑑,𝑃 0  
 
3.2.2 Signing Message 
 
Suppose that 𝑡 out of 𝑛 group members want to sign a message 𝑚. They can sign the 
message simultaneously. Here, the steps of signing the message are described. 
1) Each member selects an integer 𝑟𝑖  such that 0 < 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑛 and gcd 𝑟𝑖 ,𝑛 = 1. 
2) Computes 𝑘𝑖 ≡ 𝑔
𝑟𝑖   mod 𝑝 . 
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3) Each member broadcasts their 𝑘𝑖  to other members via a secure channel. After all 
𝑘𝑖  are received, each of them calculates 




4) By using the information of the public identity 𝑥𝑖  for other members, each of 
them calculates 






  mod 𝑛 . 
5) Calculates 
𝑠𝑖 ≡ 𝐾 ⋅ 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑕 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑃 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑖   mod 𝑛 . 
6) Each member sends 𝐾 and 𝑣𝑖  along with  𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖  as the partial signature for the 
hash-function message 𝑕 𝑚  to TD. TD checks the equality 𝑔𝑠𝑖 ≡ 𝑘𝑖
𝐾 ⋅
𝑦𝑖
𝑣𝑖 ⋅𝑕 𝑚   mod 𝑝 . If the equation holds, then  𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖  is a valid partial signature 
of 𝑢𝑖 . Otherwise, the partial signature is invalid. 




𝑑   mod 𝑛 . TD produces  𝐾, 𝑆  as the group signature for the hash-
function message 𝑕 𝑚 . 
 
3.2.3 Verifying Signature 
 
Any outsider can be the verifier, as long as he has access to the public key. After he 
receives the group signature from TD, he checks 
𝑔𝑆
𝑒
≡ 𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝑉𝑕 𝑚   mod 𝑝 . 






Theorem 1. Following the applied protocol, then the verification in the signature 
verification phase is correct. 
 
Proof: 
The equation in signature verification phase is true for valid signature since, 
            𝑔𝑆
𝑒
≡ 𝑔






                                   mod 𝑝  
                     ≡ 𝑔 𝑠𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1                                             mod 𝑝  
                     ≡ 𝑔 𝐾⋅𝑟𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1 + 𝑕 𝑚 ⋅𝑃 𝑥𝑖 ⋅𝑣𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1           mod 𝑝  








  mod 𝑝  





 𝑔𝑎0 𝑕 𝑚                mod 𝑝  
                     ≡ 𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝑉𝑕 𝑚                                      mod 𝑝  
                    
 
3.3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE FOR THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
In this subtopic, we present a numerical example to show how our threshold signature 
scheme works. We use software Maple 15 to generate all the parameters and keys and to 
perform all calculations. However, we only use small numbers to perform our scheme 
since it’s required a processor with high memory to perform the scheme with actual size 
of numbers. 
 
 Suppose that there are 5  members  𝑢1,𝑢2, 𝑢3,𝑢4 ,𝑢5  and 3  from them can 







3.3.1 Generating Keys and Parameters 
 
1) First, TD sets the following parameters: 
i. A prime 𝑝 = 14447. 
ii. Two primes 𝑎 = 31 and 𝑏 = 233, and 𝑛 = 𝑎𝑏 = 7223. 
iii. 𝜙 𝑛 =  𝑎 − 1  𝑏 − 1 =  31 − 1  233 − 1 = 6960. 
iv. A primitive root mod 𝑝, 𝑔 = 8, satisfies 87223 ≡ 1 mod 14447. 
2) Then, TD picks 𝑒 = 19 and 𝑑 ≡ 𝑒−1 ≡ 1099 mod 6960. 
3) Constructs a (3,5) threshold function, 
𝑃 𝑥 = 345 + 123𝑥 + 789𝑥2  (mod 7223). 
Then, the group secret key is 𝑃 0 = 𝑎0 = 345 and the corresponding public 
key, 𝑉 ≡ 8345 ≡ 4130 mod 14447. 
4) Sets a pair of keys for each group members as follows: 
i.  𝑥1,𝑃(𝑥1) =  1, 1257 . 
ii.  𝑥2,𝑃(𝑥2) =  2, 3747 . 
iii.  𝑥3,𝑃(𝑥3) =  3, 592 . 
iv.  𝑥4,𝑃(𝑥4) =  4, 6238 . 
v.  𝑥5,𝑃(𝑥5) =  5, 6239 . 
5) After each member receive their pair of keys  𝑥𝑖 ,𝑃 𝑥𝑖  , each of them compute 
the corresponding individual public key 𝑦𝑖  as follows: 
i. 𝑦1 ≡ 8
1257 ≡ 416 mod 14447. 
ii. 𝑦2 ≡ 8
3747 ≡ 8246 mod 14447. 
iii. 𝑦3 ≡ 8
592 ≡ 7468 mod 14447. 
iv. 𝑦4 ≡ 8
6238 ≡ 6284 mod 14447. 
v. 𝑦5 ≡ 8




The public and secret keys of the individual and group for the scheme are shown in 
Table 3.2. 
 
TABLE 3.2. The public and secret keys of the scheme. 
 Public key Secret key 
Individual 𝑦𝑖  𝑃 𝑥𝑖  
Group 𝑒 = 19 
𝑉 = 4130 
𝑑 = 1099 




3.3.2 Signing Message 
 
Suppose that 𝑢1,𝑢3  and 𝑢4  want to sign a hash functioned message 𝑚, 𝑕 𝑚 = 805. 
They can sign the message simultaneously. Here, the steps of signing the message are 
described: 
1) Each user selects randomly 𝑟1 = 186 , 𝑟2 = 407 , and 𝑟3 = 211 , and then 
calculates 𝑘1 = 8
186 = 9788 mod 14447 , 𝑘2 = 8
407 = 13107 mod 14447 , 
and 𝑘3 = 8
211 = 10188 mod 14447. 
2) Broadcasts their 𝑘𝑖  to other members through a secure channel. After all 𝑘𝑖’s are 
received, they calculate 𝐾 = 186 × 407 × 211 = 9187 mod 14447. 
3) Then, they calculate 𝑣1 =  
−3
1−3
 ⋅  
−4
1−4
 = 2 mod 7223 , 𝑣2 =  
−1
3−1




7221 mod 7223, and 𝑣3 =  
−1
4−1
 ⋅  
−3
4−3
 = 1 mod 7223. 
4) After that, they compute 𝑠1 ≡ 9187 ⋅ 186 + 805 ⋅ 1257 ⋅ 2 = 5484 mod 7223, 
𝑠2 ≡ 9187 ⋅ 407 + 805 ⋅ 592 ⋅ 7221 = 5134 mod 7223  and 𝑠3 ≡ 9187 ⋅
211 + 805 ⋅ 6238 ⋅ 1 = 4298 mod 7223 . Finally, they send  𝑠𝑖 ,𝑘𝑖  to TD as 
the partial signature for the message. 
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5) After TD receives   𝑠𝑖 ,𝑘𝑖 =   5484, 9788 ,  5134, 13107 ,  4298, 10188  , 
he checks the validity for each partial signature by showing the equality 𝑔𝑠𝑖 ≡
𝑘𝑖
𝐾 ⋅ 𝑦𝑖
𝑣𝑖 ⋅𝑕 𝑚   mod 𝑝  holds. Otherwise, the partial signature is invalid. For 
example, he checks the partial signature for 𝑢1:  
85484 = 97889187 ⋅ 4162⋅805 = 6823 mod 14447. 
6) After TD checks all partial signature are valid, then he calculate 𝑆 =
 5484 + 5134 + 4298 1099 = 1307 mod 7223. Finally, he produces  𝑆,𝐾 =
 1307,9187  as the group signature for the message. 
 
 
3.3.3 Verifying Signature 
 
After receive the group signature  𝑆,𝐾  for the hash-functioned message 𝑕(𝑚), with the 
knowledge of the group public key, verifier performs the following equality: 
81307
19
= 91879187 ⋅ 4130805 = 2455 mod 14447 
Since the equality holds, then the verifier declares that the group signature is valid for 





















In previous chapter, we already show our new threshold scheme and how it works. In 
this chapter, we will evaluate the scheme in terms of the security and efficiency. 
 
 
4.1 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
It is important to make sure that a digital signature scheme has being developed is secure 
against some security attacks. To do this, we will test our threshold signature scheme 
with some security attack and show that the scheme is heuristically secure. The attacks 
in general we considered are: 
1) The key-only attack: Adversary (Adv) searches for the secret key by using all 
information from the system. 
2) The feed attack: Adv fixes one of the components of signature and tries to find 
the rest of the component. 
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3) The chosen-message attack: Adv has an access to the signature oracle and get a 
number of valid pair of signatures-messages. 
4) The FAC attack: It is assumed that FAC is solvable. Then Adv tries to find any 
secret information of the system. 
5) The DLP attack: It is assumed that DLP is solvable. Then Adv tries to find any 
secret information of the system. 
6) The impersonate-member attack: Adv tries to impersonate a member of the 
group and generates a valid partial signature to satisfy the partial signature 
verification equation. 
 
Next, we will show one-by-one how these attacks cannot successfully break our scheme. 
 
Attack 1 (The key-only attack) 
 
i. Adv wishes to obtain group secret keys 𝑑 and 𝑃(0) by using all information from 
the system. In this case, Adv needs to solve 𝑒𝑑 ≡ 1  mod 𝜙 𝑛   and 𝑉 ≡
𝑔𝑎0   mod 𝑝 , which are clearly infeasible due to the difficulty of solving FAC 
and DLP. 
ii. Adv also cannot derive the individual secret key, 𝑃(𝑥𝑖)  from the equation 
𝑦𝑖 ≡ 𝑔
𝑃 𝑥𝑖   mod 𝑝  due to the difficulty of solving DLP. 
 
Attack 2 (The feed attack) 
 
Adv might try to derive their own group signature (𝐾, 𝑆) from the verifying equation 
𝑔𝑆
𝑒
≡ 𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝑉𝑕 𝑚   mod 𝑝  for a given message 𝑚  by letting one integer fixed and 
finding the other one. We can divide this attack into two cases: 
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i. Adv selects 𝐾 and tries to figure out the value of 𝑆. In this case, Adv calculates 
𝜆 ≡ 𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝑉𝑕 𝑚   mod 𝑝 . Then, he has to solve 𝜆 ≡ 𝑔𝑆
𝑒
  mod 𝑝 . 
Unfortunately, ho cannot find 𝑆  from this equation due to the difficulty of 
solving FAC and DLP simultaneously. 
ii. Adv also might try to fix 𝑆  and find 𝐾 . In this case, he calculates 𝛾 ≡ 𝑔𝑆
𝑒
⋅
𝑉−𝑕(𝑚)  mod 𝑝  and tries to solve 𝛾 ≡ 𝐾𝐾   mod 𝑝 . This is worse scenario 
because even FAC and DLP are solvable, the value of 𝐾 still hard to find except 
by try and error, but it is time consuming. 
 
Attack 3 (The chosen-message attack) 
 
Adv may also try collecting 𝑡  pairs of message-signature  𝑘𝑖𝑗 , 𝑠𝑖𝑗   and 𝑚𝑗 , where 
𝑗 = 1, 2,… , 𝑡 and attempts to find the individual secret key 𝑃 𝑥𝑖 . In this case, Adv has 𝑡 
equations as follows: 
𝑠𝑖1 ≡ 𝐾1 ⋅ 𝑟𝑖1 + 𝑕 𝑚1 ⋅ 𝑃 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑖   mod 𝑛  




𝑠𝑖𝑡 ≡ 𝐾1 ⋅ 𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑕 𝑚𝑡 ⋅ 𝑃 𝑥𝑖 ⋅ 𝑣𝑖   mod 𝑛  
 
In the above equations, there are  𝑡 + 1  unknowns, i.e., 𝑃 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑟𝑖𝑗 . Hence, 𝑃 𝑥𝑖  
stays hard to detect because Adv can generate infinite number of solutions of the above 








Attack 4 (The FAC attack) 
 
It is assumed that Adv is able to solve FAC. In this case, he knows the prime 
factorization, 𝑎 and 𝑏, and find 𝑑. Then he tries to solve the equation 𝜆 ≡ 𝑔𝑆
𝑒
  mod 𝑝 . 
However, he still cannot find 𝑆  from this equation because he does not know 
𝑆𝑒  (mod 𝑛) since DLP is not solvable. 
 
Attack 5 (The DLP attack) 
 
Supposed that DLP is solvable, then from the equation 𝜆 ≡ 𝑔𝑆
𝑒
  mod 𝑝  Adv can find 
𝑆𝑒  (mod 𝑛). However, he still cannot find 𝑆 due to the difficulty of solving FAC. 
 
Attack 6 (The impersonate-member attack) 
 
Adv might try to impersonate member 𝑢𝑖   by randomly selects an integer 𝑟𝑖  and 
broadcasting 𝑘𝑖 ≡ 𝑔
𝑟𝑖   mod 𝑝 . Since the group signature is determined by all 𝑡  
members, without knowing the individual secret key 𝑃 𝑥𝑖 , Adv cannot generate a valid 
partial signature  𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑖  to satisfy the verification equation. 
 
 
4.2 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
From the security analysis, we already show that how our scheme is secure against some 
security attacks. Another evaluation for a signature scheme is efficiency analysis. In 
efficiency analysis, we investigate the performance of our scheme in terms of number of 
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keys, computational complexity, and communication cost. Then, we compare our 
scheme with the threshold signature scheme based on DLP, which is proposed by Harn 
(1994). The following notations are used to analyze the performance of the scheme: 
 
 SK and PK are the number of secret and public keys respectively. 
 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝  is the time complexity for executing the modular exponentiation 
computation. 
 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙  is the time complexity for executing the modular multiplication 
computation. 
 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣  is the time complexity for executing the modular inverse computation. 
 𝑇𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡  is the complexity for executing the modular square root computation. 
 𝑇𝑕  is the time complexity for performing hash function. 
  𝜂  denotes the bit length of 𝜂. 
 
The efficiency analysis of the scheme and the comparison are shown in the Table 4.1. 
TABLE 4.1. The efficiency analysis and comparison 






No of keys SK 𝑡 + 2 𝑡 + 1 
 PK 𝑡 + 2 
 









 4𝑡 + 1 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝
+  2𝑡2 + 3𝑡 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙
+  𝑡2 − 𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣
+ 𝑇𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡 + 𝑇𝑕  
 
4𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 2𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙  
 
 4𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝
+  5𝑡2 − 2𝑡 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙
+ 2 𝑡2 − 𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑣
+ 𝑇𝑕  
 
3𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙  
 
Size of parameters / 
Communication 
cost 
  2𝑡 + 1  𝑛 
+  3𝑡 + 1  𝑝  
 𝑡 + 1  𝑛 





From Table 4.1, it is shown that our threshold signature scheme is less efficient compare 
with the threshold signature scheme with single problem. This disadvantage of our 
scheme due to the element of both factoring and discrete logarithm in the signing and 
verifying steps. Even though our new scheme runs no faster than the scheme with single 
problem, it will be a choice for everyone who prefers a more secure system rather than a 




































For integrity reason, nowadays most of the online documents, transactions, and 
messages from an organization or society need to be signed by more than one person. 
That’s why threshold signature schemes based on various problems in number theory 
have being developed. From the past decades until now, many threshold signature 
schemes were being designed based on single number theory problem, such as factoring, 
discrete logarithm, residuosity, elliptic curve, etc. Since it is understood that one day 
these problems could be solved, all signatures that depend on the problem will be no 
longer secure. One of the strategy to overcome this situation is by designing a signature 
scheme based on multiple hard number theory problems. 
In this research, we developed a new threshold signature scheme based on two 
number theoretical problems; namely factoring and discrete logarithm. In this report, we 
start with research introduction, where we reviewed some literatures and discussed the 
properties of digital signatures. Then we defined our problem statement, research 
objectives, and significance of the research. 
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In Chapter 2, we discussed some important topics in number theory that related 
to our scheme. We also reviewed some cryptographic functions that we used throughout 
the scheme. 
In Chapter 3, we presented our new threshold signature scheme. Generally, a 
digital signature scheme consists of three steps: generating keys, signing message, and 
verifying signature. We explained all of the steps and we also showed a numerical 
example to show how our scheme works. 
For any digital signature scheme, it is important to evaluate the scheme in terms 
of the security and performance. That’s why in Chapter 4, we evaluated our scheme by 
showing it is heuristically secure against some cryptography attacks. We also showed 
that our scheme is significantly efficient, compare with a threshold signature scheme 
based on single problem. 
 
5.2 FUTURE WORKS 
 
In the past, there were many threshold signature schemes have being developed based on 
various single problem in number theory. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
threshold signature scheme designed based on factoring and discrete logarithm. As we 
already stated in this report, the scheme based on multiple hard number theory problems 
are more secure than the scheme based on single problem. Here, we list some future 
research that can be done related to this area: 
i. Developing threshold ordinary signature schemes based on others number 
theoretical problems such that residuosity and elliptic curve. 
ii. Developing threshold function-based signature schemes based on two hard 
problems. 
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